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ABSTRACT
Globalisation has provoked a deep transformation in international law, political affairs and 
governance with contradictory consequences. It has stimulated the cosmopolitan project of global 
constitutionalism, transnational integration and the unification of democratic standards. However, 
it also resulted in the fragmentation of international affairs, the deterioration of constitutional de-
mocracy and a feeling of a growing shortage in democracy on national and international levels of 
governance. Trying to balance the impact of these two opposing trends, the author analyses the 
positive and negative effects of globalisation on constitutional development regarding such issues 
as transnational constitutionalisation, democracy and national sovereignty, the changing place of 
multilayer constitutionalism, the international separation of powers, and the system of global gov-
ernance in the establishment of transnational constitutional democratic legitimacy. From this point of 
view, the populist backslide in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) looks dangerous and unforeseen, 
but it is a systemic and potentially predictable reaction of global regions on the uneven character of 
integration, the lack of democratic legitimacy and a new answer to the contortions and dysfunctions 
of global governance. An adequate response to these challenges could be found in a new concept of 
constitutional integration based on ongoing dialogue between the transnational and national actors 
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of legal globalisation. This dialogue is possible by using a conflict-mediation strategy, elaborated by 
international experts, especially, for the deliberation of complex and protracted conflicts, which have 
no clear practical solutions in the short to medium term.
Keywords: global constitutionalism; constitutionalisation; fragmentation; sovereignty; legitimacy; 
conflict-mediation strategy
INTRODUCTION
The international debate on global legal stability therefore cannot ignore the 
problem of constitutional transformation – legal integration vs. fragmentation 
dispute. The most simple solution to the dilemma consists in the polarised oppo-
sition of two trends in the development of the international legal order, namely, 
integration (in the form of the constitutionalisation of international law) and its 
fragmentation (in form of the separation of different global constitutional regions, 
supra-national actors or regimes). According to this view, the two rival trends 
cannot be coordinated and a sharp collision cannot be avoided. The result could be 
described as a “zero-sum game”, as progress in integration means an equal regress 
in fragmentation and vice versa. This approach is therefore useful as a methodo-
logical presumption grounded on the very abstract, linear and teleological vision of 
globalisation considering its development from a black and white perspective and 
associating it strictly with positive results – progress in human rights protection, 
the supremacy of law and law-based states. The current global pandemic, however, 
reveals the other side of globalisation – economic recession, legal contradictions, the 
prevalence of egoistic motives, and the perceived interests of separate regions and 
national states over general international values or a different interpretation of its 
content and “common” character. That simple fact makes it important to reconsider 
the complex character of legal globalisation and the reciprocal relations between 
its opposite sides – constitutionalisation and the fragmentation of international 
constitutionalism.
Among the priorities of the academic community since the end of the Cold War 
in 1990 are global integration, transnational law and European constitutionalism. 
The key effort has concentrated on the analysis of the constitutional transformation 
in all countries – primarily members of the Council of Europe – by monitoring 
the positive and negative results. The criteria for this evaluation were founded on 
“global”, “Western” or European legal values and standards and the accumulated ex-
perience of the transnational accommodation of constitutional principles in different 
political and cultural traditions. This system of criteria, elaborated by international 
experts, oriented policy makers toward integration – the creation of the European 
Union as a principally new legal entity and, perhaps, a model for future global 
constitutional settlement. That strategy presumed the development of conventional 
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liberal democracy by providing legal recommendations and promoting international 
constitutional reform for all governments which confronted such difficulties but 
who demonstrated the readiness to establish and protect democracy, the rule of law, 
the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and the protection of human 
rights. This was based on the belief in the future triumph of Western or European 
liberal values, in spite of all the current conflicts, difficulties and misperceptions of 
constitutional transformation, which could and should be overcome by the “natural” 
self-evidence of the competitive preeminence of the liberal model. This vision of 
the future, attached to a solid ideological legitimacy, played a twofold role in the 
projection of global constitutionalism, making it a practical tool for international 
integration but also an ideological illusion.
By doing this important work, the European academic community, over the 
past 30 years, has achieved sufficient results in the area of global and comparative 
studies, practical reforms and teaching activities in different countries and has 
confronted similar challengers to democratic transition and constitutional moderni-
sation. Current developments in global and European constitutionalism have shown 
grounds for optimism but also a preoccupation with the changing place and role of 
liberal legal values, regarding issues such as the growing populism, nationalism, 
constitutional backsliding, counter-reforms, and even the rejection of previously 
accepted democratic institutions and legal guarantees by some governments. This 
trend makes it important to concentrate on this negative turn in order to understand 
its causes, implications and possible outcomes for the future of global legal system.
This article analyses the principal aspects of the problem: the general impact 
of globalisation on legal development; legal integration and fragmentation as two 
opposing but mutually compatible processes in international affairs; the balance 
of optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of global constitutionalism; new chal-
lenges to democracy and the nature of the current constitutional backslash. We 
articulate the logic of its origins and historical evolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE); the erosion of the quest for legitimacy in new political regimes; 
the comparative place and peculiarities of the post-Soviet region; the impact of the 
Russian “revisionist” constitutional model; and the changing place of constitutional 
jurisprudence in the countries under consideration.
In the concluding parts of the work, the author discusses the possibility of a new 
conflict-mediation strategy as a methodological tool for resolving the contradiction 
between the participants – transnational and national actors of legal globalisation. 
Considering the growing fragmentation in international relations as a real threat to 
global legal stability and a way toward “normative disorder”, this paper proposes 
a pragmatic and value-free evaluation of this trend putting forward some recom-
mendations to overcome this negative dynamic. From this point of view, global 
constitutionalism is not a definitive solution but a new framework for international 
dialogue about the future of the international legal order.





GLOBALISATION: COSMOPOLITAN, INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
The theory of cosmopolitan or global constitutionalism presupposes the pos-
sibility of a new synthesis of international and constitutional law in a new legal 
settlement – global, transnational or supra-national law.1 The theory of global 
constitutionalism has several important presumptions, including that the descrip-
tion of legal globalisation is possible in terms of classic constitutionalism; that the 
categories of global, transnational and national constitutionalism are appropriate 
to reflect the nature and hierarchy of the different levels of the international legal 
regulation; and that the normative substance of global governance could be subse-
quently extracted from the “constitutionalisation” of the international law.2 Thus, 
the essence of constitutionalisation is the convergence of international and national 
legal norms – the progressive influence of international treatises on domestic con-
stitutionalism, and the international adoption and incorporation of some elements 
of traditional domestic constitutional law, first of all, guarantees of basic human 
rights and freedoms.3 These assumptions, if admitted, make the whole picture 
clearer but include some unavoidable simplifications regarding the complexity of 
the legal sources of global law, which includes the norms of international law and 
custom, and a different set of norms and principles of national constitutions, which 
would be difficult to unify without enforced standardisation.
The conflict-provoking potential of current legal regulation originates from 
three conflicting and differently oriented trends, rooted in the construction of mod-
ern European constitutional design: the cosmopolitan vision of global constitution-
alism; transnational constitutionalism; and the idea of national constitutionalism 
and jurisprudence.
(1) Global constitutionalism, rooted deeply in European history, means theory 
and practice is oriented toward the cosmopolitan establishment of a new interna- 
tional order based on the values and norms which are common (or would be common) 
to the whole of humankind.4 In spite of different and contradictory interpretations of 
this concept and ways to achieve this goal, the ideal of a global constitution played 
a very important role in the formative debates before and after the creation of the EU. 
1 Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, eds. A.F. Lang, A. Wiener, Cambridge 2017; A. Atilgan, 
Global Constitutionalism: A Socio-Legal Perspective, Heidelberg 2018; A. Peters, Global Constitution-
alism, [in:] Encyclopedia of Political Thought, ed. M. Gibbus, London 2015, pp. 1484–1487.
2 Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives, ed. N. Tsagourias, 
Cambridge 2007; O. Diggelmann, T. Altwicker, Is There Something Like a Constitution of International 
Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitutionalism, “Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht” 2008, vol. 68, pp. 623–650.
3 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalisation of International Law, Oxford 2009.
4 A. Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Oxford 2014.
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The romantic vision, anchored in a cosmopolitan Kantian ideal of a global govern-
ment, is visible in the United States of Europe and represents itself in the declared 
or tacit presumption that the new European construction would potentially be the 
best model not only for Europe but also for other regions of the world. The criticism 
of this concept spread and even began to prevail in academic debates only after the 
failure of the European constitution project (2004–2005).5
(2) Transnational or international constitutionalism and jurisprudence looks to-
ward a more realistic compromise between two opposing trends in the search for 
a middle way between cosmopolitan and national constructions of the European Com-
monwealth and as a more effective combination of international norms and national 
constitutional norms. This concept of “international constitutional law” highlights 
the role of international law in bridging the gap between a supranational constitution 
and national legitimacy, and creates a stable construction of the main legal values 
via the selection of common constitutional principles, their normative incorporation 
into international human rights treatises, and their interpretation by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and national constitutional courts.6 European law, 
according to some interpretations, was the result of this original amalgam of interna-
tional and national law, opening the way for a cross-country judicial reexamination 
and the transformation of the European legal landscape.7 The ultimate result of that 
compromise strategy was the Lisbon Treaty (2007) which functionally plays the role 
of the European Constitution. This holistic strategy remains disputed in the context 
of the current sharp division in the EU over the meaning of constitutional values and 
their legal interpretation in some countries of CEE.
(3) National constitutionalism remains the basis for the principle of state sov-
ereignty, historically granted by the Westphalian international order, substantially 
transformed and limited under globalisation to become the subject of debate about 
its future role in international and constitutional law.
Among the most important topics in this debate are:
−	 the changing place of the sovereign state in a post-Westphalian world,8
−	 the importance of a cross-cultural and comparative understanding of phe-
nomena from different regional perspectives,9
5 Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy?, eds. C. Corradetti, G. Sartor, “Working 
Paper LAW” 2016/21, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44286/LAW_2016_21.pdf?se-
quence=1 [access: 20.08.2021].
6 Th. Kleinlein, A. Peters, International Constitutional Law, Oxford 2017.
7 G. Halmai, Perspectives on Global Constitutionalism: The Use of Foreign and International 
Law, The Hague 2014.
8 Global Constitutionalism and Its Challenges to Westphalian Constitutional Law, ed. M. Belov, 
London 2018.
9 Global Constitutionalism from European and East Asian Perspectives, eds. T. Suami, 
M. Kumm, A. Peters, D. Vanoverbeke, Cambridge 2018.





−	 the perceived misbalance, if not eclipse, of the classic constitutional model 
in its traditional Western understanding, and the possibility of a new theory 
and political interpretation of constitutionalism, by its hypothetical discon-
nection from the principle of standard sovereignty,10
−	 the potential of the existing language of jurisprudence to reflect new diversi-
fied trends in legal development and reproduce semantically all the nuances 
of the crosscutting issues of legal regulation and global governance,
−	 the apparent difficulties and dubious character of the traditional juristic 
terminology elaborated and taken historically from only one global region 
(the West) for the interpretation of the legal reality of other regions and the 
cultural integrity of the entire world.
The idea of sovereign constitutionalism recently appeared to be a central point 
for the articulation of all anti-globalist, or “revisionist” movements in Europe and 
worldwide.
INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION: A SEPARATION OF WAYS IN 
GLOBAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
Global constitutionalism is the theoretical construction and institutional reform 
agenda which tries to reflect the complex reality of integrating legal development 
based on the interaction and impact of international and national constitutional 
law.11 Global constitutionalism, at the current stage of the debate, combines three 
different perspectives which could potentially be more or less adequate to the 
new reality: new theory building, the ideology of social movements, and legal 
construction.12 The most visible representation of this phenomenon is in the pro-
gressive constitutionalisation of international law.13 This combines two options: 
the integration of constitutional norms into international treatises, and the reverse 
impact of these treatises on national law, their judicial system and practices (which 
becoming binding by international norms and judicial precedents).14 As theorists of 
global constitutionalism think, this process paves the way for the formation of the 
original type of transnational (supranational or global) constitutionalism. It could be 
10 The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, eds. P. Dobner, M. Louglin, Oxford 2010.
11 A. Atilgan, op. cit.; A. Peters, Global Constitutionalism…, pp. 1484–1487.
12 A.N. Medushevskiy, Global Constitutionalism: The Theory of the Global Legal Order or 
a New Political Ideology?, “Historia Provinciae. The Journal of Regional History” 2020, vol. 4(3), 
pp. 995–1019.
13 Transnational Constitutionalism…
14 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, op. cit.
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represented as a pure legal phenomenon, in a form of “political constitutionalism”15 
or in new concepts of global governance.16
The cosmopolitan constitutional ideal, in its holistic interpretation,17 provides an 
ambitious program of reconfiguring global governance, creating clear guidelines for 
the whole construction, for decision-making and a definition of its limits – globally, 
regionally and nationally.18 Cosmopolitan constitutionalism, in the contemporary 
understanding, originates in the international deliberations after the end of the 
First World War (the League of Nations) and after the Second World War.19 These 
represented the first projects of global constitutionalism (Chicago draft 1948)20 and 
formative debates on the UN Charter as the “Constitution of the International Com-
munity”.21 “The cosmopolitan turn” in the legal and political agenda demonstrated 
the new importance of the foundation of the EU as a model of new political and 
legal organisation, described as global or integral constitutionalism,22 realising the 
Kantian ideal of a cosmopolitan international legal organisation in contemporary 
form.23 International law in Europe was a transformation and fixed a new reality 
“between tradition and renewal” in the form of the constitutionalisation of the 
transnational law of EU Member States.24
For optimists that new constellation is proof of the progressive enlargement of 
global constitutionalism in its Western liberal meaning: the development of trans-
national legal regulation, the limitation of the state sovereignty principle, and the 
creation of new international constitutional norms and actors beyond states, the im-
plementation of the so-called “Trinitarian mantra of global constitutionalism”. The 
Trinitarian mantra means the manifestation of the pure essence of Western thought: 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law.25 This group of experts believes that 
15 R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy, Cambridge 2007.
16 E. Benvenisti, Law of Global Governance, The Hague 2014.
17 D. Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideas and Realities, Cambridge 2010.
18 Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, eds. 
J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, Cambridge 2009.
19 A. Mazover, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations, Princeton–New Jersey 2009.
20 Chicago draft (1948): Committee to Frame a World Constitution Preliminary Draft of a World 
Constitution, Chicago 1948.
21 B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, 
Leiden 2009.
22 M. Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Concept of Public 
Law, “Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies” 2013, vol. 20(2), pp. 605–628.
23 J. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, Berlin 2011; A. Somek, op. cit.
24 M. Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, “European 
Journal of International Law” 2005, no. 16, pp. 13–124.
25 M. Kumm, A. Lang, J. Tully, A. Wiener, How Large Is the World of Global Constitutionalism?, 
“Global Constitutionalism” 2014, no. 3, pp. 1–8.





global constitutionalism is a viable concept and its priorities are achievable through 
a simple transformation of its traditional meaning by “disconnecting Constitutions 
from Statehood”,26 or by creating a new system of international judicial precedents and 
the mediation of transnational courts in cooperation with their national counterparts.27
For pessimists, it is proof of the growing uncertainty, if not crisis, of interna-
tional law regarding such negative implications as the protection of the status quo 
and its unfairness, unification and formalisation.28 The entire concept of global 
constitutionalism for its opponents cannot be admitted because of its artificial 
theoretical character, one-dimensional (pro-liberal) ideological orientation and 
practical inconsistencies covering the degradation of representative democracy, the 
discrimination of minority rights and a general authoritarian teleological impetus.29 
They look forward to creating an alternative concept of global constitutionalism 
based on ecology, the internet, post-liberal values and the protection of minorities 
instead of traditional, liberal, state-oriented solutions as represented in “A Manifesto 
for Feminist Global Constitutionalist Order”.30
The optimist view of global legal integration recently became the object of 
sharp criticism by its opponents, who emphasized the role and growing importance 
of another process, the fragmentation of international law, which is regarded as an 
alternative concept of the global legal transformation. The fragmentation of inter-
national law reveals the, now obvious, trend for a disintegration in international 
relations.31 The disintegration of the global legal space in different global regions, 
states refusal to follow universal (or “internationally” adopted) principles of law, the 
growing commitment to find their own legal “identity” and attempts to reestablish 
a perceived “national sovereignty”.32 This reestablishment of state sovereignty, 
presumably lost in process of “the global transition to democracy”, very often im-
plicates a form of populism – right-wing or left-wing – against the establishment, 
the ruling elites, liberal democratic principles or constitutional institutions.33
26 U.K. Preuss, Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Vi-
able Concept?, [in:] The Twilight of Constitutionalism…
27 A.S. Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication 
in Europe, “Global Constitutionalism” 2012, vol. 1, pp. 53–90.
28 A. Atilgan, op. cit.; Global Constitutionalism and Its Challenges…
29 Ch.E.J. Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective, Leiden–Bos-
ton 2011.
30 A. O’Donoghue, R.A. Houghton, A Manifesto for Feminist Global Constitutionalist Or-
der, 2018, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2018/08/01/a-manifesto-for-feminist-global-constitutio-
nalist-order [access: 15.08.2021]
31 Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation of International Law: A Practical Inquiry, eds. 
A. Jakubowski, K. Wierczyńska, London 2016.
32 S. Bhandari, Global Constitutionalism and the Path of International Law, Leiden 2016.
33 A.N. Medushevskiy, Populism in the West and in Russia: A Comparative Perspective of Sim-
ilarities and Differences, [in:] Populism as a Common Challenge, ed. C. Crawford, Berlin–Moscow 
2017, pp. 47–57.
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In sharp contrast to the optimist vision of the global constitutional movement, 
contemporary critics emphasized important counter-arguments. First, by describing 
integration in terms of constitutionalisation, the globalists ignore the phenomenon 
of “false legitimacy” and the “illusive unification” of international legal norms, 
institutions and governance. Second, in reality, the integration has been significantly 
reduced by fragmentation. Third, the thesis about the end of the epoch of nation 
states seems to be an exaggeration and cannot explain the apparent growing role 
of the most powerful states in international affairs. Fourth, the assumption that 
international constitutionalisation would be the precursor to national democrati-
sation appeared to be debatable or even wrong because many states demonstrated 
the opposite trend. Fifth, political practice cannot prove the positive transformation 
of international and constitutional law in terms of their mutual convergence.34 Ac-
cording to sceptics, international and national norms differ in their assumptions, 
normative logic and potential impact. Theoretically, a multilayer constitution is 
not a solution but a regress of traditional constitutional ideology represented in 
the classics of liberal thought – the destruction of the rule of law and representa-
tive parliament-like democracy by the unification of global ruling standards and 
henceforth favoring distortions and populist reactions.35
The cleft between integration and fragmentation means separate ways of global 
legal development, the formation of two different strategies in global constitutional-
ism. Legal globalisation at the crossroads symbolizes a choice between opposites for 
political elites. Are they mutually exclusive, compatible, or could they be combined 
into some new order in theory or in practice? The answer is possible through the 
reconstruction of key definitions and the political reality behind them.
THE CLASH BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION AS 
A CHALLENGE FOR THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER
In the literature, in spite of its abundance, we cannot find any common inter-
pretation of constitutionalisation. Different axiological and legal interpretations 
are represented by at least seven main concepts. First, for public international law, 
constitutionalisation means the search for legal control over politics inside the in-
ternational legal order itself, in order to compensate for the erosion of this control 
in national states, by transferring to the international level those concepts which 
34 S. Xavier, False Universalism of Global Governance Theories: Global Constitutionalism, 
Global Administrative Law, International Criminal Institutions and the Global South, PhD Disser-
tation, 2015, http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/20 [access: 15.08.2021].
35 A. Sajó, R. Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism, 
Oxford 2017.





were traditionally reserved for national constitutions.36 Second, for the standard 
normative approach, this phenomenon is interpreted in “compensation theory” – 
the mutual adaptation of different levels and institutions of global legal regulation 
and governance for the coordination and harmonisation of international process-
es.37 Third, from a sociological point of view, global constitutionalisation is not 
target oriented, and could be more the result of the self-installed societal regimes 
constituted, formed and selected by practice in a spontaneous rather than a pur-
pose-oriented international legal strategy.38 Fourth, the institutionalist (or pluralist) 
approach focuses less on values, principles and norms and more on the whole entity 
of structures, institutes or actors which take part in the realisation of the power 
nexus beyond states.39 Fifth, for a constructivist approach in international relations, 
constitutionalisation means the process of identity changes and “normative self-en-
trapment” in which states and other international actors are involved.40 Sixth, for 
the functionalist approach, constitutionalisation is not necessarily a stable trend, 
and could go in different directions (unification, the limitation of democracy and 
legitimacy, the degradation of human rights) and its result determined, more or less, 
by a consciously admitted strategy, is adopted by society and elites.41 Seventh, the 
position of traditional constitutionalism argues for the possibility to transfer national 
constitutions to the transnational level and, if necessary, transform the meaning of 
traditional constitutionalism in order to reflect the perceived enfeeblement of the 
nation state or to make a new sense of this tradition for its adoption by international 
legal regulation.42
Fragmentation and its reciprocal relation to constitutionalisation pose many 
problems. We reconstructed five main approaches in this area:
1. As mentioned, there is a standard, generally shared, understanding of both 
processes as mutually incompatible: the progress of one automatically re-
duces the other.
2. Their treatment as cross-cutting issues: constitutionalisation (if not inter-
preted as a move to one global “super-constitution”) itself is a fragmented 
36 E. De Wet, The Constitutionalisation of Public International Law, [in:] The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, Oxford 2012.
37 A. Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental In-
ternational Norms and Structures, “Leiden Journal of International Law” 2006, vol. 19, pp. 579–610; 
A. Von Bogdandi, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, 
“Harvard International Law Journal” 2006, vol. 47(1), pp. 223–242.
38 G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation, Oxford 2012.
39 N. Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union, [in:] The Paradox 
of Constitutionalism: Power and Constitutional Form, eds. M. Loughlin, N. Walker, Oxford 2008.
40 T. Kleinlein, Constitutionalisation in International Law, “Beiträge zum ausländischen öffent-
lichen Recht und Völkerrecht” 2012, vol. 231, pp. 703–715.
41 Ch.E.J. Schwöbel, op. cit.
42 M. Louglin, What is Constitutionalisation?, [in:] The Twilight of Constitutionalism…, pp. 47–69.
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process, going inside international law and progressively involving national 
constitutions as represented in a system of various sectorial regulatory re-
gimes of international organisations and corporations – a system in which 
“we find (only) constitutional fragments”.43
3. The interpretation of both trends as compatible: fragmentation is both a chal-
lenge and a tool of constitutionalisation; their reciprocal connection in dif-
ferent areas of international law is a question of “practical inquiry”, and 
constitutionalisation itself is nothing more than a target or “a claim”.44
4. The idea that constitutionalism as a concept of international law in principle 
cannot be used as an instrument to overcome fragmentation: beyond the state 
mechanisms of legal regulation (absent in international law, in contrast to 
constitutional), fragmentation is an instrument of normative conflict regu-
lation rather than an instrument to overcome it.45
5. The political imagination of constitutionalism as a negative process tends 
to the unification of norms, interpretations and decisions based on only one 
(Western) legal culture. That means the reproduction of the dominant West-
ern legal standards in the form of “neocolonial rule”,46 by the exclusion of 
minorities or any other legal cultures. From this position, fragmentation is 
the natural answer to this challenge – a more positive than negative trend in 
international law opposed to the danger of “false universalism” implicitly 
present in a theory of global constitutionalism and governance.47
For many theorists, the fragmentation of international law is not a simple re-
jection of international law. If interpreted as a tool of normative conflict solution, 
it includes a variety of interpretations: as a possibility to regulate tensions between 
unification and diversity; as a problem of procedural character – fragmentation as 
a transition of technical expertise from the national to the international context; 
and as an interaction between rules and institutional practices culminating in the 
erosion of international law.48 The agreement with one or another position in this 
theoretical dispute means the choice of a pragmatic attitude – the strategy of some 
policy of law in the area of global and national constitutionalism.
43 A. Peters, Constitutionalisation, [in:] Concepts for International Law: Contributions to Dis-
ciplinary Thought, eds. J. D’Aspremont, S. Singh, Cheltenham 2017.
44 Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation…
45 R. Delpano, Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation of International Law: A Theoretical 
Inquiry, “European Journal of Legal Studies” 2013, vol. 6(1), pp. 67–89.
46 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, “International 
Community Law Review” 2008, no. 3, pp. 3–27.
47 S. Xavier, op. cit.
48 R. Delpano, op. cit., p. 88.





HOW LARGE IS THE WORLD OF GLOBAL LEGAL FRAGMENTATION? 
“PROTECTIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM” AS A NEW POLITICAL REALITY 
OF GLOBALISING WORLD
As an important counterweight to the dominant mainstream interpretation of 
global constitutionalism, there are alternative projects (anti-globalism among them). 
Their centre of gravity concentrates on the fragmentation of international regulation 
in the form of global regional constitutional self-determination. The construction 
of global regions provides the possibility to articulate the particular characteristics 
of a constitutional formula combining not only common principles, but the logic of 
their implementation and judicial interpretation based on specific regional, cultural 
and historical attitudes. This approach is represented mainly by the critical school of 
international law49 arguing a new reality of “post-national law” as a serious danger to 
constitutionalism, pluralism and human rights.50 The critical school emphasizes the 
growing role of fragmented regional identity in following aspects: the polarisation 
of the global centre and periphery; the construction of a global east and a global 
south;51 the history of self-determination ideas and movements;52 the reevaluation 
of the role of different continents: Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America.53 A special 
point is a growing importance of sub-regions (as, e.g., CEE) and the impact of 
influential countries – the US, Russia, China – which are generally not ready to 
follow the prescriptions of international law in many important respects.
A part of this debate is the new preoccupation with finding a bridge between 
Western and Asian prospects for global constitutionalism by understanding this phe-
nomenon from European and Asian Perspectives54 and representing Eastern models 
not as deviance, but as alternative liberal or non-liberal concepts. However, how 
is it possible? Third World approaches to international law traditionally opposed 
classic the “Western” liberal outlook arguing a “transcivilisational perspective on 
Global Legal Order” as a way to overcome “West-centric and Judiciary-centric 
deficits in international legal thoughts”,55 and realise the so-called “post-liberal” 
49 M. Bönnemann, L. Jung, Critical Legal Studies and Comparative Constitutional Law, 2005.
50 N. Kirsch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford 
2010.
51 Constitutionalism of the Global South, ed. D.B. Maldonado, Cambridge 2013.
52 E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anti-colonial Nationalism, Oxford 2007.
53 Asian Approaches to International Law and the Legacy of Colonialism, eds. J.-H. Paik, S.-W. 
Lee, K.Y.L. Tan, London 2012; J. Frosini, F. Biagi, Political and Constitutional Transitions in North 
Africa: Actors and Factors, London 2014; S. Bhandari, op. cit.
54 Global Constitutionalism from European…
55 Y. Onuma, A Transcivilizational Perspective on Global Legal Order in the Twenty-first Cen- 
tury: A Way to Overcome West-centric and Judiciary-centric Deficits in International Legal Thoughts, 
“International Community Law Review” 2006, vol. 8, pp. 29–63.
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concept of human rights, property, information rights and ecology protection in 
transnational constitutional regulation and governance.56 The approach of Islamic 
countries represents an alternative way emphasizing the role of “Islamic religious 
values” as an integral part of the human rights agenda.57 China is, perhaps, the most 
prominent case of a “separate way” based on a Confucian version of legal philos-
ophy and a practice clearly opposing democracy and meritocracy as two different 
principles of social and legal constructivism.58 There are other paths beyond the 
standard European interpretations, as the particular case of Japan shows.59 In theory, 
it is becoming more and more evident that global constitutionalism could result 
not necessarily in liberal democratic forms, but provide the grounds for different 
international hybrid legal regimes if not for the Global Leviathan solution.60
This theoretical approach in its radical form denies even the positive role of 
existing international law as a predominantly “Western” construction, historical-
ly created and used by European countries for the legitimation of colonial and 
neo-colonial rule and domination in other regions of the world.61 This approach also 
demands a redefinition of the very nature of such important notions as democracy, 
sovereignty, rule of law, a law-based state, and minority rights, as traditionally 
interpreted according to Western liberal standards. This “demand for justice” for 
developing regions could easily be transformed into a more conservative legal 
ideology by using old cultural and ideological stereotypes of mass consciousness, 
as, e.g, the Russian post-Soviet reality has demonstrated in recent years.62 This 
theoretical debate implies a reevaluation or, rather a re-invention, of legal identity 
as a form of regional self-determination in terms of political culture, and of periph-
ery, hybrid, or imitation regimes of “limited pluralism”, “transformative regimes”, 
“illiberal democracy”, demonstrating their commitment to move from law to “real 
politics” and constitutional authoritarianism.
Very often, this turn in legal interpretation is interpreted as a simple backsliding 
of democracy – a primitive populist reaction to positive global changes and the 
56 M. Carducci, A. Castillo, Nature as “Grundnorm” of Global Constitutionalism: Contributions 
from the Global South, “Rivista Brasileira de Direito” 2016, vol. 12(2).
57 C. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and 
Pan-Asian Thought, New York 2007.
58 M.A. Carrai, Global Constitutionalism and the Challenge of China’s Exeptionalism, [in:] 
Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy…, pp. 95–113.
59 A. Kimijima, Global Constitutionalism and Japan’s Constitutional Pacifism, 2011, www.
ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/Vol.23-3/03_Kimijima.pdf [access: 15.08.2021].
60 Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy…
61 V. Kumar, Towards a Constitutionalism of the Wretched, 27.07.2017, https://voelkerrechtsblog.
org/towards-a-constitutionalism-of-the-wretched [access: 15.08.2021].
62 A.N. Medushevskiy, Recht und Gerechtigkeit in den politischen Debatten der postsowjti-
schen Ara (mit Nachtrag 2017), [in:] Gerechtigkeit in Russland: Sprachen, Konzepte, Praktiken, ed. 
N. Plotnikov, München 2019, pp. 423–460.





response of mass consciousness to irritating impulses such as a deficit of democ-
racy and legitimacy, economic deterioration, migration and political instability. 
According to this mainstream interpretation, the global liberal constitutional agenda 
confronted the complex variety of new unforeseen threats but still did not provide 
any sufficient protection capable of stopping such regrettable developments. They 
involving such developments as Brexit, the conservative protectionist course of 
the Trump administration,63 the degradation of liberal constitutionalism in Eastern 
Europe (Poland, Hungary and Romania’s constitutional and judicial counter-re-
forms) in reaction to the “post-communist project” difficulties.64 It also involves 
the progressive erosion of law-based states in the post-Soviet space, and in “new 
democracies” – India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa.65 The unexpected 
“end of post-communism” in Eastern Europe demarcated a line between stable 
ideological beliefs and growing uncertainty in the future in all countries of the 
so-called “transition to democracy area” in different parts of the world.
Perhaps the most prominent representation of this new trend could be found 
in the 1993 Russian Constitution. The international debate about “how large the 
world of global constitutionalism is”,66 initially involved skeptical remarks about 
its subject and heuristic potential,67 and resulted in rather pessimistic conclusions. 
The world of global constitutionalism has become much narrower in recent years 
than it was in the period of “liberal triumphalism” in the 1990s. The crucial role 
of the West in “ruling the world”68 gradually transformed in the opposite direc-
tion, critically described as “ruling the void”.69 The erosion of legal integration, 
the deficit of legitimacy, the vacuum of responsibility and global governance are 
the most visible consequences. We can agree with that diagnosis but not with its 
explanation. The interpretation of the deterioration of global constitutionalism 
and the prevalence of fragmentation over integration can scarcely be reduced to 
a conservative populist reaction against liberal values in order to establish author-
itarian rule. A much broader set of factors should be considered. The failure of 
the international community to create an uncontroversial concept of future; the 
growing asymmetry in international relations and the information agenda; a per-
63 J. Havercroft, A.Wiener, M. Kumm, J. Dunoff, Editorial. Donald Trump as Global Constitu-
tional Breaching Experiment, “Global Constitutionalism” 2018, vol. 7(1), pp. 1–13.
64 B. Buden, Zone des Übergangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus, Berlin 2009.
65 T. Piccone, Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal Order, New 
York 2016; T.G. Daly, Democratic Decay in ‘Keystone’ Democracies: The Real Threat to Global 
Constitutionalism?, 10.05.2017, www.iconnectblog.com/2017/05/democratic-decay-in-keystone-de-
mocracies-the-real-threat-to-global-constitutionalism-i-connect-column [access: 15.08.2021].
66 M. Kumm, A. Lang, J. Tully, A.Wiener, op. cit., pp. 1–8.
67 G.W. Brown, The Constitutionalisation of What?, “Global Constitutionalism” 2012, vol. 1(2), 
pp. 201–228.
68 Ruling the World…
69 P. Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy, London 2013.
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ceived lack of reliable information (“fake news”); the threat of the unpredictable 
consequences of trans-national economics and governance; the growing suspicion 
of civil society toward local elites as simple translators of the global elite’s orders. 
As a result, we have a sociologically proven demand for stability and order with 
growing separation between two formally similar, but substantially different con-
cepts of global and national constitutionalism – global human rights-oriented and 
nation state-oriented clusters.70
All that does not mean the simple repudiation of legal globalisation but the 
formation of a demand for new forms which are more suitable to the format of 
cultural diversity, historic traditions, national interests and an appropriate timetable 
for reforms. In many countries, the adoption of classic constitutional standards 
proved their inapplicability to the complex social reality of developing countries 
characterised by a lower level of social integrity, an abundance of national, reli-
gious or ethnic conflicts, escalating violence, and, therefore, the degradation of 
fidelity to their proclaimed legal principles and norms. The dysfunctions of liberal 
constitutionalism in this cultural situation stimulates hybrid solutions oriented 
toward the search for stability and minimal predictability of society in which state 
power takes the principle part as a mediative force among contrasting partisan 
positions of internal and external players. Playing this stabilising role in the mod-
ernisation process, the state bureaucracy and national elites consider the adopted 
constitutional principles as a promise, but not as a binding force for the state itself, 
preferring to use a special theoretical explication such as “law in transformation”, 
“transitional justice”, etc.
The constitutional ideal remained, but its full practical enforcement is being 
postponed by many countries into the unclear future. The meaning of this trend 
is a conceived move from idealism to realism, from values to interests and from 
exaggerated beliefs toward attainable options and the possibility of protecting them 
legally in any possible way. “Protective constitutionalism” is, perhaps, the formula 
of this new international reality, which means the limited adoption of international 
constitutional value-standards in order to protect national “interests” – cultural 
identity, traditional values, economic priorities, institutional frameworks and po-
litical stability – which are challenged by new destructive global trends. Right or 
wrong, this is the new reality of international affairs.
70 D.S. Law, M. Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, “California 
Law Review” 2011, vol. 99(5), pp. 1163–1258.





THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL BACKSLASH:  
THE EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
AS A KEY RESOURCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POPULISM
One of the key restraints to a stable democratic process is the erosion of demo-
cratic legitimacy on European and national levels of regulation. At the core of the 
problem is the erosion of trust in European institutions. This “deficit of democracy” 
became the subject of broad international discussion, and revealed different opinions 
on the future of Europe. Supranational institutions were interpreted by skeptics 
as the imposed machinery of control over national governments, and ipso facto 
considered as vehicles of the centralised, unelected and nontransparent European 
bureaucracy. This criticism became a prominent argument in the current debate 
about the future of the EU and has had a real impact on the populist mobilisation in 
countries of CEE.71 The big problem arises in the causes and outputs of the whole 
transformation – the deficit of democracy is the cause of the populist reaction or 
vice versa, and the populist backslide articulating or even creating the ground for 
constitutional remission.
In countries of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia), 
which were earlier at the forefront of the post-Communist democratic transition, 
the constitutional restoration today has reached its apex in the form of re-tradition-
alisation – the reproduction of some Soviet and even pre-Soviet legal stereotypes 
and attitudes. This conservatism includes sharp criticism of the Western model of 
liberal democracy, an apologia for nationalism and collectivist values, self-isolation, 
and an inferiority complex (in the form of historical victimisation and respective 
national state grandeur beliefs). It represents, in the composition of legal ideologies, 
recommending such remedies as the promulgation of a vague idea about the neces-
sity to protect the cultural and religious national traditions against globalisation, 
westernisation or migration, a rewriting of history, a pretend constitutionalism, 
and authoritarianism.72
In this context, the principles of democratic legitimacy, a parliamentary system 
and the separation of power are in danger of deformation, stimulating populist 
solutions represented in different forms:
1) the establishment of the mechanical authoritarian stability through consti-
tutional reforms (amendments) and the installation of a de facto one-party 
dominance in parliament with subsequent constitutional or legal counter-re-
71 Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hun-
gary, and Romania, ed. A. Von Bogdandi, P. Sonnevend, Oxford 2015.
72 A.N. Medushevsky, Konstitutsionnaya retraditsionalisatsiya v Vostochnoy Evrope i Rossii, 
“Sravnitel’noye konstitutsionnoye obozreniye” 2018, vol. 134(1), pp. 13–32.
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forms process involving the extension of the dominant party’s control over 
another branches of power (Hungary, 2012 and Poland, 2015),
2) the reproduction of permanent political instability in the triangle of parlia-
ment-government-president (the so-called “coup” in Bulgaria, 2016, or the 
impeachment crises in Romania, 2014, 2017, the governmental crisis in 
Macedonia and Monte Negro),
3) the proliferation of attempts to correct the existing model of a monistic 
parliamentary system by the enforcement of presidential power (e.g., the 
constitutional reform in Czech Republic, 2012), or intensive debates about 
the radical transformation in the established form of government (constitu-
tional debates in Poland, Romania, Latvia).
In all countries of the region, the growing political polarisation is reproduced 
in the following sociological trends:
1) the eroded popular trust in electoral campaigns (often their results are de-
clared illegitimate by the opposition before the end of the elections, or 
immediately after them),
2) a preference for institutions of direct democracy (referendum as a strict 
alternative to parliamentarianism and democratic competition of political 
parties), or
3) the growing demonstration of public support for the alternative (and pre-
sumably “less corrupt”) institutions of moral influence (the Church, army 
or a strongman “national leader” of any kind).
The restoration of the legitimacy of constitutional and parliamentary institutions 
and adequate political competition is, thus, the cornerstone of constitutional mod-
ernisation and a necessary precondition for the establishment of an agenda capable 
of overcoming the growing populist constitutional transformation.
To sum up, it is important to develop a clear vision of the EU’s identity and 
future, based on a careful reevaluation of its constructive priorities, and a pragmatic 
calculation of the long-term effects of the populist reaction as a persistent factor in 
the integration process. The balance between the EU’s integrity and separatist trends 
is unstable, providing the possibility for different theoretical constructions from 
confederation to federation, but eventually involves different legal constructions 
towards more or less centralised control over member-states in the interpretation 
of European law and jurisprudence. After Brexit, that means the acute necessity 
to define the EU’s legitimacy based on a renovated consensus between Old and 
New Europe or rather on a new modality of conflict resolution. It is already evident 
that the retroactive populist project, as realised in some countries of CEE, has its 
own cultural grounds, logic and sustainability, representing an alternative vision 
of Europe, and should be treated as a long-term factor in the European integration/
disintegration constitutional power-game.





THE LOGIC OF THE GLOBAL LEGAL TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE
Global integration, as a process and a result of flexible inter-state agreements, 
does not include any independent supra-national regulation per se, nor provide the 
possibility for different views on the role and place of the nation state in global 
governance and multilayered constitutionalism. For globalists this place should 
be reduced to its historical minimum if not eliminated in future; for their more 
traditional opponents, this place should be retranslated in a new system of trans-
national regulation. The crucial point is to define which level of multilayered con-
stitutionalism should have priority – global, transnational, regional, domestic, or 
their combination in different sectoral constructions. This debate on the scope and 
prospects of the national state vs. international organisations became the crucial 
factor for the dramatic separation of ways between the liberal mainstream, and the 
populist movements which spread all over the world in the 2010s.73
The rise of populist movements appeared to be a “common challenge”74 to the 
established liberal democracies like the UK (Brexit), the US (Trump administra-
tion), the EU, as well as developing democratic countries like Brazil, India and 
South Africa. They could be found in global regions, like Caribbean Commonwealth 
countries, which were parts of the former colonial empires – British, French or 
Dutch and now shared some problems of the European Union as its partners or 
integral parts of some member-states. Here the commitment to self-consolidation 
reflects not only common anti-globalist protest but also the search for a special 
post-independence situation with regard to the legal continuity of precolonial, co-
lonial and postcolonial periods. That makes important the crosscutting influences 
of different European legal traditions, indigenous law and transitional priorities in 
form of legal “creolisation” and other special local doctrines and practices.75 In the 
European context, this trend to combine and assimilate different legal traditions has 
specific implications in CEE and former parts of the USSR regarding their common 
geo-political place, cultural traditions, and historic experience under Soviet domi-
73 Populism as a Common Challenge…; G. Ekiert, Three Generations of Research on Post-Com-
munist Politics – a Sketch, “East European Politics and Societies” 2015, vol. 29(2), pp. 323–327; 
S. Erlanger, In Eastern Europe, Populism Lives, Widening a Split in the E.U., “The New York Times”, 
28.11.2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/world/europe/populism-eastern-europe.html [access: 
15.08.2021].
74 R. Eatwell, M. Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Rindle 
2018; A.N. Medushevskiy, Populism in the West and in Russia…, pp. 47–57.
75 The Oxford Handbook of Caribbean Constitutions, eds. R. Albert, D. O’Brien, S. Wheatle, 
Oxford 2020.
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nance or an imperial past. The importance of the cultural dimension of conservatism 
is obvious, while not identical in different global regions, sub-regions or countries.76
Important basic prerequisites for this mental transformation include the pro-
gressive conflict between positive law and fairness; a reevaluation of the historical 
tradition of global civilisations, regions and countries, combined with the search for 
a new cultural integrity and specific legal identity.77 This research strategy involves 
the systematisation of contested global narratives on security matters and mutual 
misperceptions in international and reciprocal affairs.78 It involves the analysis of 
citizens’ growing mistrust towards multilayered constitutionalism, local govern-
ments and elites, which are presumably incapable of protecting their respective 
countries or groups from global problems and challenges or from undesirable 
transformations of the political regime.79
The current populist protest against global (European) constitutionalism is 
based on the hyperbolised and oversimplified interpretation of the so-called “con-
stitutional identity” of countries, “partisan constitutionalism”, overrepresented 
“national sovereignty”, carefully cultivated peculiar national traditions of legal 
regulation, which are partly real, partly artificially re-invented, or introduced by 
governing political forces in the interest of self-preservation.80 This kind of consti-
tutional thought became the main ground and the predominant legitimising motive 
for the resistance of anti-globalist forces and conservative national elites to global 
and European constitutionalism regarding the scope, intentions and goals of the 
supra-national legal regulation of national affairs.
The new situation in the EU, provoked by the rise of a conservative populist 
movement, fixed the point of bifurcation of the conflicting and overlapping prin-
ciples of European integration, covering the meaning of constitutional values, its 
interpretative strategies and the agendas of the current constitutional reforms (or 
counter-reforms). The main question here is whether the revisionist state group of 
CEE remains a sustainable part of the European constitutional commonwealth or 
76 G. Pop-Eleches, B. Tucker, Europe’s Communist Regimes Began to Collapse 30 years ago, 
but Still Shape Political Views, “Washington Post”, 12.11.2019, www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/2019/11/12/europes-communist-regimes-began-collapse-years-ago-still-shape-political-views 
[access: 15.08.2021].
77 A.N. Medushevskiy, Law and Revolution: The Impact of Soviet Legitimacy on Post-Soviet 
Constitutional Transformation, “Telos” 2019, vol. 189, pp. 121–135.
78 Security Narratives in Europe: A Wide Range of Views, ed. W. Zellner, Baden-Baden 2017; 
Russian–Western Blind Spots: From Dialog on Contested Narratives to Improved Understanding, 
Berlin 2019.
79 A. Sajó, R. Uitz, op. cit.; P. Cubicek, Regime Transitions and Variation in Post-Commu-
nist Europe, 2.04.2020, www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-
9780199756223-0115.xml [access: 15.08.2021].
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whether they already stand apart and are in the process of formulating their own 
“genuine”, i.e. separate, concept of European constitutionalism. How can the integ-
rity of the EU persist in the face of new global challenges for economics, society 
and security,81 variety of perspectives,82 and the progressive divide in European 
values and their fulfillment in Eastern Europe?83
Constitutional re-traditionalisation, fixed in new legislation, embraces all the 
vital elements of human rights in CEE:
−	 the gradual revision of liberal legal values in order to keep the “historic 
identity” (the word “liberalism” has become more and more pejorative in 
many countries of the region),
−	 the new (or, rather, old) interpretation of state sovereignty as opposed to 
international human rights regulation (with a respective diminishing role 
of constitutional courts),
−	 the deep rethinking of the authentic liberal notions of the people’s sovereign-
ty and the civic nation toward more nationalistic if not ethnic constructions, 
combined with visible discrimination against national minorities (Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Baltic countries),
−	 the subsequent rejection of state neutralism in religious matters (the new 
interpretation of “hate speech” in Hungary),
−	 the revision of family, sexual and reproductive rights (a series of constitu-
tional amendments adopted in Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania in 2013–2017 as opposed to the amendments adopted in 
West European countries in the same period),
−	 a more politicised interpretation of the international treatises which formed 
the basis for the new constitutional balance in some Balkan countries, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina (Dayton agreement), Macedonia (Ohrid agreement) and 
Kosovo (Ahtisaari plan) with prospective ethnic and political destabilisation 
in this region,
−	 the growing trend toward self-isolation and a limitation of the “openness” 
of CEE (the spontaneous reaction to migration crisis in Hungary, Czechia, 
Romania and Poland),
−	 systematic efforts to neutralise the influence of earlier accepted international 
humanitarian law over national constitutional legislation under the pretext 
81 Europe and Globalisation: the Dangers and the Assets 2013, 2.12.2013, www.robert-schuman.
eu/en/european-issues/0296-europe-and-globalisation-dangers-and-assets [access: 15.08.2021].
82 J. Techau, For Predictions on the Future of Europe, 12.01.2016, https://carnegieeurope.eu/
strategiceurope/62445 [access: 15.08.2021].
83 J. Henley, 30 Years after Communism, Eastern Europe Divided on Democracy’s Impact: Pew 
research reveals very different views on whether countries are better off today, “The Guardian”, 
15.10.2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/15/30-years-after-communism-east-europeans-di-
vided-over-democracys-impact [access: 15.08.2021].
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of protecting the national culture or legal tradition, and the recent practical 
COVID-19 pandemic restrictions,
−	 the respective limitation of the role and independence of constitutional justice 
and the courts in national legal systems,
−	 new official rhetoric on important cultural matters regarding the reinvention 
of conservative cultural and religious stereotypes, a new historical memory 
agenda, a rewriting of history and the cult of the powerful national state or 
leader. The moralisation of political rhetoric by dominant mass media seems 
to be the other side of the same coin – the substitution of true journalism 
and analysis by emotional exclamations based on very simple arguments, 
rumours and superstitions.
These trends of conservative restoration, as the Venice Commission pointed out 
in its various opinions, illustrate the growing level of deviance of the national juris-
dictions from the European Charter, the Lisbon Treaty and important conventions 
on human rights. What limits does this process of constitutional restoration have? Is 
it still possible to speak about an undivided concept of European constitutionalism? 
The answer is not clear and depends on who determines (and how) the essence of 
European values and the scope of the discretional power of national governments to 
interpret it. Could it be a new constitutional assembly created for the re-invention 
of the European Commonwealth, European parliament, a system of new inter-state 
agreements, the European Court of Justice, ECHR, or European civil society in for-
mation? The answer is crucial for the destiny of the European integration project and 
for the future of global constitutionalism, European law and governance.
PECULIARITIES OF THE POST-SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL 
SETTLEMENT DELAY FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The constitutional development of the post-Soviet area in a narrower sense 
(former republics of the USSR) has some particular characteristics in comparison 
with Eastern Europe and the wider world.84
We cannot trace here the regular cyclical evolution of constitutionalism because 
of its uneven and superficial character and the role of contradictory external and 
internal influences. Legal and institutional instability is perhaps the most important 
common feature of post-Soviet constitutionalism, which looks like a “permanent 
constitutional fever”.85 That definition means the feeling or common perception of 
the presence of some important peculiarities in comparison to more stable CEE:
84 Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. A. Fruhstorfer, M. Hein, Berlin 2016.
85 A.N. Medushevskiy, Tendentsii postsovetskich politicheskich rejimov v svete noveisheiy volny 
konstitucionnych popravok, “Obschestvennye nauki I sovremennost” 2018, no. 2, pp. 49–65.





1) a great variability of the constitutional models under consideration in the 
formative period which illustrates the “privilege of retardation” – the theo-
retical possibility of adopting any kind of models in spite of their different 
historical origin, based on different legal cultures, and to transplant them 
from more advanced countries or, rather, to have the historical possibility 
of experimenting with them,
2) the often rapid and unpredictable changes of constitutional priorities – from 
their partial corrections until the adoption of models which had been rejected 
as inadmissible,
3) the abundance of constitutional amendments to each adopted constitution, 
often without great respect for the formal procedures of amendment which 
show the absence of a deeply rooted constitutional culture,
4) the absence of stable and neutral constitutional justice,
5) the unresolved question of the finality of crucial constitutional solutions: 
after the adoption of every new constitution or amendment the debates nor-
mally continue, providing new projects and proposals. This “constitutional 
game” resembles a form of political self-identification for political parties 
or groups rather than coherent and substantive legal discourse.
Another important feature of this unstable catch-up in institutional design is 
the lack of solid common ground for constitutional development and its aims. All 
countries rejected the Soviet model of nominal constitutionalism after the collapse 
of the USSR. The main starting point for constitutional modernisation in the region 
was the Russian Constitution of 1993. Being designed as a temporary constitutional 
settlement for the transitional period, this constitution produced an original syn-
thesis of liberal legal guarantees (based on international human rights treatises), 
and a rather authoritarian construction of the presidential power interpreted as the 
main force and the guardian of the irreversibility of democratisation. Formally, the 
adopted form of government was similar to the presidential-parliamentary model 
of the French Fifth Republic but avoided some important checks and balances of 
this system. In reality, this construction paved the way for a system of plebiscitary 
authoritarianism with overrepresented presidential power and personified rule. 
This “authoritarian component” of the Russian constitutional and political system 
was the main problem for all post-Soviet political debates, and remained the main 
theme for all current projects of constitutional modernisation.86
The internal contradictions of the Russian constitutional model opened the way 
for different if not opposing constitutional interpretations in post-Soviet countries 
in favour of more liberal (parliamentarian), or more authoritarian (presidential) 
principles covering a great variety of national experiments inspired by the Russian 
86 V. Milov, A. Medushevskiy, I. Zaslavskiy, Constitution and Economy after Putin: A Roadmap 
for a New Russia, Washington 2018, pp. 19–31.
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version of mixed government. The separation of ways in regional constitutional 
development makes it possible to identify three main strategies:
1) the “colour revolutions” as the direct and law-breaking alternative to the 
Russian constitutional model (Moldavia, Georgia, Kirgizia, Ukraine before 
2014, Armenia in 2016),
2) gradual constitutional reform inspired by authoritarian government for 
self-preservation in power (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan after 2014),
3) the maintenance of mechanical legal stability without substantive constitu-
tional reforms or with the presence of quasi-reforms fulfilled by the use of 
cosmetic changes (Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan before 
2014).
The reciprocal influence of two factors – the constitutional design and the political 
regime – is the subject of debates in legal and political science literature. The change 
in the form of government (e.g., the move from a presidential to a parliamentary) 
could be proof of real regime liberalisation, or could symbolise the deterioration of 
democracy if used only for the protection of the established elites in power. It could 
even be both: some constitutional reforms taken in favour of a parliamentary system 
could be initiated by the ruling president in order to keep him in power as prime 
minister but resulting in a deeper political transformation (e.g., Georgia and Arme-
nia). This interconnection between the legal and political parameters of the reform 
agenda reveals important common characteristics of constitutional modernisation 
in CEE interpreted as the “Paradox of Power” – the coexistence of formally strong 
authoritarian rule with the logic of “state weakness in Eurasia”.87
From the perspective of global constitutionalism, the post-Soviet region has its 
own and very specific place, comparable in some way with postcolonial countries, 
or the countries which instantly obtained their independence after the collapse of 
the USSR. The countries of this region demonstrated a commitment to accept the 
mainstream democratic principles becoming a part of the international constitutional 
consensus. They show a clear intention to transform or reduce the binding force 
of some important international values or principles in order to adopt them for the 
purposes of new-created national states, and the existence of a broad spectrum of 
threats and hesitations regarding the protection of unstable sovereignty and legiti-
macy of states and political regimes from various external and internal influences. 
Like a cardiogram, the constitutional development of the region reacted almost 
reflexively to different impulses coming from the most powerful actors in the region, 
Russia, the US, the EU and China, and in some cases Turkey and Iran. In these 
constitutional experiments, the post-Soviet region could play an important role in 
the selection of transplanted models, their adoption, assimilation, hybridisation, 
evaluation and practical implementation in very different cultural contexts.
87 J. Heathershow, Paradox of Power: The Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia, Pittsburgh 2017.





THE RUSSIAN FORMULA OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: A MOVE 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP?
Constitutionalism in unstable, transitional, hybrid and authoritarian regimes 
became a special area of investigation of lawyers and political scientists as a glob-
al phenomenon in recent decades, centring on the post-Communist region.88 The 
concluding phase of the Russian post-Soviet legal transformation coincided with 
a deep reevaluation of the legitimacy of the political regime as represented in the 
2020 constitutional reform. This reevaluation started much earlier and became 
a natural part of the conservative political romanticism formed after the collapse of 
the USSR as the predominant official reaction in the post-Soviet society and elite 
after 2000.89 This reevaluation overwhelmed the Russian constitutional and legal 
development of the last decade.90 The systemic revision of the Russian constitution 
established in 1993 formally represented a set of concrete amendments to the text 
of the 1993 Constitution made in formal accordance with amendment procedures. 
The 2020 constitutional reform also revised the legitimacy formula of the Russian 
political regime in five main directions.
First, the reconsideration of the positive and negative legitimacy criteria in 
terms of space, time and the sense of social being. The liberal ideological paradigm, 
which prevailed in the period of constitution-making, was strictly reduced by the 
reform provisions in several key aspects:
−	 the replacement of the spirit of global constitutionalism based on the idea of 
“universal human values” by a commitment to restore “traditional values”, 
and rehabilitate the presumably lost spirit of “national sovereignty”,
−	 a shifted balance of international and national constitutional law – the adop-
tion of the amendment giving the Russian Constitutional Court the power 
to nullify decisions of transnational courts if they contradicted the national 
constitution,
−	 the adoption of new norms transforming the rational-legal legitimacy of 
power by using new, value-oriented cultural or identity terms: national des-
tiny, historical tradition, religion, traditional family values, language, terri-
torial identity, and patriotism. The essence of this ideological transformation 
in concentrated form represented the idea of “elite nationalisation”. This 
was a set of new provisions prohibiting dual citizenship for all state and 
88 Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, eds. T. Ginsburg, A. Simpser, Cambridge 2014.
89 Power and Legitimacy: Challenges from Russia, eds. P.-A. Bodin, S. Hedlund, E. Namli, 
London–New York 2012.
90 A.N. Medushevskiy, Russian Constitutional Development: Formal and Informal Practices, 
“BRICS Law Journal” 2019, vol. 6(3), pp. 100–127; idem, Constitutional Reform in Russia: Sub-
stance, Directions and Implementation, “Forensic Research and Criminology International Journal” 
2019, vol. 7(6), pp. 286–294.
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municipal officials in order to reduce the cosmopolitan orientation of the 
elite and to put the West-oriented opposition beyond the political process.
Second, a reevaluation of substantive and instrumental legitimacy in terms of 
a new “social contract” between society and political power, and a set of practical 
measures to reinstall it on a new conceptual basis. The new formula of social con-
sensus introduces a new equilibrium between the liberal ideology of the market 
economy and a new ideological construction of social solidarity. This concept, 
incorporated into the text of the new constitution with new amendments, treats 
solidarity issues in terms of social responsibility, and a social partnership between 
business and the state. It creates a new balance between rights and responsibility, 
reintroducing respect for “working people”, and the establishment of neo-paternalist 
control of the state over social policy priorities (by a fixed minimal wage, pensions 
and social security measures) in order to guarantee sustainable economic develop-
ment. This conceptual transformation of constitutional norms provides a new legal 
foundation for the restoration of the social responsibility of state – a corporatist or 
state-capitalist system including elements of social paternalism and institutions of 
mass mobilisation under government control and supervision.
Third, a revision of the balance between different levels of legitimacy in the 
framework of a federalist state: federal, regional and local. In the block of amend-
ments this is realised by the constitutional adoption of a new conceptual formula 
on the “entire system of public power”: the sovereign power of a political union 
embracing the whole country and functioning as a complete system in constitution-
ally determined, concrete organisational forms. The legal and political parameters 
of this organisation, as clarified by amendments to correct the Russian federal 
system in three major aspects: the federal centre becomes more powerful; subjects 
of Federation becomes less powerful; and local self-government becomes totally 
integrated into the “power vertical”. The system of public power has been com-
pleted by an important transformation of Russian bicameralism produced by the 
cumulative effect of constitutional amendments concerning new procedures for 
the formation of the Upper Chamber, the creation of the State Council as a new 
institution of mediation and coordination, and granting new important preroga-
tives to the Constitutional Court in the area of regional legislative control. In this 
system of neo-Imperial rule, all conflicts between different levels of government 
are solved by political decisions according to the principle of the entire system’s 
“functional unity”.
Fourth, the contradiction between the legitimate purposes and institutional 
mechanisms of power implementation. The declared legitimate purpose of the 
reform included such items as the development of civil society, the growth of 
political competition, direct and representative forms of democracy, and the role 
of parliament (the State Duma) in the separation of powers. In spite of some cor-
rections to all branches of power introduced by amendments in order to maintain 





their reciprocal institutional flexibility, the main undeclared result of the reform is 
in the concentration of power. This result has been achieved by the delegation of 
important prerogatives of all branches to one super-power institute: the head of the 
state as the legitimised centre of the whole system of public power and the highest 
arbiter in all institutional conflicts. The key innovation is the formal constitutional 
adoption of presidential control over the government and its responsibility only to 
the president. That means a definite shift from the dual or mixed form of govern-
ment (formally established in 1993) to a quasi-presidential system of government 
(because the system’s lack of checks is adequate for a standard presidential system).
Fifth, the constitutional amendments change the balance of constitutional and 
meta-constitutional power legitimacy. The constitutional parameters of the legitima-
cy of the head of state take their origin from formal constitutional norms and their 
judicial interpretation; meta-constitutional prerogatives of presidential power come 
from its symbolic role in the public space, in international diplomacy and in the 
resolution of social, national and political conflicts. The constitutional amendments 
create grounds for a new type of legitimacy combined in one legal and extra-legal 
form by fixing a new very broad meta-constitutional legitimacy – the responsibility 
of the president for maintaining “civil peace and national agreement” in the coun-
try. This statement is remarkably similar to provisions of some other post-Soviet 
countries with authoritarian political regimes. Following these, the amendments 
introduced practically unlimited power for the head of state and immunity during 
and after his stay in office, crossed the border between legal and personal legiti-
macy, and opened the way in practice to an unlimited stay in power. In sum, this 
system could be defined by using the term “constitutional dictatorship”,91 a system 
of government, where the transformation of the constitutional order is made on 
the basis of the existing Supreme Law, the agreement of society (demonstrated in 
a plebiscite form) and the unanimous support of all branches of power in order to 
establish the unlimited power of the presidential office, personified in the figure 
of the actual leader.
The legitimacy formula introduced by the 2020 constitutional amendments is 
internally contradictory: it combines a constitutionally determined political system 
with extra-constitutional (namely cultural) parameters including history, nation, sol-
idarity, overrepresented public power, and the symbolic (meta-constitutional) status 
of the head of the state. The system of constitutional values has been transformed 
by shifting the balance of international and national law, positive and negative 
legitimacy and reduced to administrative tools of enforcement. In this formula the 
sovereign (people) delegate, formally and democratically, its power to the head of 
the state, conducting ipso facto the role as its sole and permanent representative 
91 Idem, Perechod Rossii k konstitucionnoy dictature: razmyshleniya o znzchenii reformy 2020 
goda, “Sravnitel’noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie” 2020, vol. 136(3), pp. 33–50.
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in power. The constitutional reform fixed important “pragmatic” legal changes, 
introduced in the previous decades regarding the conservative revision of the 1993 
Russian Constitution’s liberal impetus, and resumed a new legal reality – a neo-im-
perial state with a plebiscitary political regime. This reconstruction of power is in 
full accordance with the logic of the restoration of historical periods concluding the 
post-Soviet constitutional cycle, namely, its third phase – reconstitutionalisation 
(a reversed interpretation of the initial sense of constitutionalism on the grounds 
of a purely restoration logic).
LAW AND POLITICS: THE EVOLVING ROLE 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
The populist turn in CEE actualised the role of constitutional justice in the 
protection of the liberal democratic institutional system. Institutions of constitu-
tional control play a twofold role in constitutional settlement: they are known as 
a neutral legal instrument of constitutional interpretation (“oracles of the law”); and 
they also represent an important branch of the separation of powers, perhaps the 
“least dangerous” one, but still an element of the political system. In this last, they 
cannot avoid references to general moral values, principles. Activist engagement in 
political confrontation over the legal priorities of each respective country92 becomes 
a subsequent actor of politico-legal dynamics93 from a national and transnational 
perspective.94 That makes Constitutional Court a real centre of the legal policy for-
mation, actualizing the problem of its place in the system of separation of powers, 
institutional independence and judicial interpretation of constitutional principles 
and norms in all countries under consideration.
This situation (since the famous debates between Hans Kelsen and Karl Schmitt 
in the Weimar republic) is normally described as the dilemma of a judge’s choice 
between two opposite modes of judicial behaviour – the juridisation of politics or 
the politicisation of law. Today this dilemma is no less important than before: the 
growing social polarisation, “partisan constitutionalism” and the populist revision 
of constitutional principles highlighted the role of an independent, neutral and 
transparent judiciary. The new situation can also explain why institutions of consti-
tutional control have become the main target of populist initiatives in the sphere of 
legal policy. They are usually made under the convenient pretext of democratisation, 
92 V.C. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, Oxford 2010.
93 T. Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review: A Comparative Analysis, Cambridge 
2019.
94 Constitutional Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective, eds. D. Kapiszewski, G. Silver-
stein, R.A. Kagan, Cambridge 2013.





which is interpreted as the restoration of the lost “genuine” popular (or national) 
sovereignty and a revival of the direct social control over elites. “Juristocracy”,95 
following this logic, is a tool of elite dominance and thus should be transformed 
into a more appropriate democratic system of jurisprudence under the control of 
a parliamentary majority. A part of the new theoretical explanation of this trend is 
represented, for example, in the concept of “popular constitutionalism” as opposed 
to the “aristocratic nature” of constitutional courts as unelected institutes of “jur-
istocracy”, or, recently, in the demand to “take the constitution away from courts” 
(in the US). This degradation of trust in national constitutional jurisprudence in 
many countries where populism is a real political force has also another side. The 
commitment of national elites to stop or limit unpleasant international influences 
(e.g. the precedents of transnational courts) which can reduce the scope of political 
control of populist governments over domestic constitutional development is fully 
in accordance with the presumed and carefully protected fragmentation logic.
The responses given to this challenge in CEE during the 30 years of post-Soviet 
transformation enable a reconstruction of three major ideal types of constitutional 
justice by “policy of law”:
−	 constitutional courts as an effective barrier against populist demands. This 
attitude is manifested by many courts, for example, during the first stage of 
the transitional process, in order to delegitimise anti-liberal collectivist and 
egalitarian demands and to dismantle market economy principles,
−	 courts as formally impartial players. In some cases, which look like the silent 
adoption of a modified version of the American Supreme Court’s “political 
question doctrine”, the readiness to remain neutral in the competition for 
power among branches, and avoid decisions in some explosive cases by 
delegating the power to decide to other, “political”, branches – parliament 
or government. This type of court behaviour is demonstrated, for example, 
in the treatment of some complex aspects of the admissibility of “opportun-
ist” political coalitions between parties with opposite ideologies in order to 
protect their control over a divided parliament,
−	 courts as non-independent and even active transmitters of the populist course 
into the national legal system. This type of behaviour involves different and 
even polar attitudes, from the adoption of the neutrality principle to activist 
“silence” in marginal situations which include a skillful combination of 
different legal and political intentions and arguments (political arguments 
disguised as legal ones is only one method of populist jurisprudence).
The lack of stability, independence and neutrality in constitutional jurispru-
dence in CEE parliamentary democracies could be partly explained by the historic 
95 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origin and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, 
Cambridge 2004.
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combination of three main parameters: uneven constitutionalism, the adoption of 
the Kelsenian model of abstract control of constitutionality, and the nomination 
of justices reserved for only one branch of power, namely, parliament. The com-
bination of these three parameters creates a peculiar background for the potential 
backsliding of independent jurisprudence. The abstract control prerogative makes 
courts the true policy makers in constitutional matters, but this power could be 
monopolised by the dominant parliamentary majority through the selection and 
nomination of judges, thus, under the strict control of the legislative branch. In the 
absence of other checks and balances, on different historical or sociological grounds 
(or their progressive erosion in a populist revision), the systemic transformation 
could result in the eclipse of liberal constitutionalism.
The political interpretation of justice, as demonstrated by many analysts, has 
been clear in Hungary (since 2012)96 and Poland (since the constitutional crisis of 
2015),97 but also is quite visible in other countries of the region. The wave of new 
constitutional and legal amendments inspired and sponsored by the EU in Albania 
(2008, 2015–2016), Bulgaria (2015), Romania, and Serbia in the last ten years re-
considered and highlighted the importance and role of constitutional courts in their 
respective countries but reportedly did not achieved the full-scale independence 
of judicial power.
The radical transformation of the Russian Constitutional Court was the result 
of the 2020 Constitutional amendment as well. The court apparently received new 
and important prerogatives in the policy of law formation. The constitutional court 
now has the power to check the constitutionality of all laws, including laws on 
constitutional amendments, just before the president signs them; to nullify the deci-
sions of international courts, made on the grounds of ratified international treatises 
if they are considered contradictory to the national constitution; to constitutionally 
control the legislation of the Federation’s subjects before it is adopted by regional 
powers; to becomes the highest arbiter in legislative controversies between parlia-
ment and the president. However, this visible growth in the political importance 
of the constitutional court coincided with another group of changes, provisions 
on the nomination and resignation of justices, new procedures of deliberation 
and decision-making, which in sum made this institution more dependent on and 
controlled by presidential power.
This trend toward politicised jurisprudence is represented even more clearly in 
all countries of the former Soviet space: the last wave of constitutional amendments 
96 Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area…
97 M. Matczak, Poland’s Constitutional Crisis: Facts and Interpretations, The Foundation for 
Law, Justice and Society Policy Brief 2018; K. Szczypska, Further Erosion of the Polish Democ-
racy: Providing Feedback for the First EU Rule of Law Report, 5.05.2020, https://en.odfoundation.
eu/a/26796,odf-welcomes-persecuted-polish-judges-and-prosecutors-in-brussels [access: 15.08.2021].





demonstrated the diminished priority of international law, the growing deviances 
from formally adopted standards of rule of law, and the subsequent reinterpreta-
tion of the constitutional justice neutrality principle. The formal pretexts for this 
reinterpretation could differ and involve application to the real challengers – the 
restoration of traditional religious values, state security enforcement against ter-
rorist threats, migration crises, the degradation of governability or anti-corrup-
tion measures. Hence, the displacement of the constitutional jurisprudence and its 
devaluation has a very important undeclared component – the search for political 
stability by the new power-hungry political forces in political and constitutional 
re-traditionalisation.
That explains the bulk of dubious initiatives in the countries under consider-
ation:
1) the restoration of “lost sovereignty” via constitutional amendments, approved 
to reconsider the place of the international conventions and ECHR precedents 
in domestic legal regulation,
2) the revision of laws regulating the status, prerogatives and functions of 
constitutional courts, or the procedures of nomination and denomination of 
the justices,
3) the transformation of the institutional design of the constitutional jurispru-
dence as such.
Some countries (Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine) experimented with the hy-
bridisation of different international models, the replacement of constitutional courts 
with supreme courts, or their combination in one institution without any regard to 
the legal and historic specific features of Anglo-Saxon or continental systems of law, 
the structure and hierarchy of sources of law, etc. That made it possible to describe 
solutions with simple political arguments. Ironically, the main argument in many 
such cases was the de-politicisation of the court nexus to make it independent from 
political pressure and avoid the influence of the former political forces.
Many preoccupations still exist about the role of “agreements” and bargain-
ing in legal decision-making regarding the formal and informal practices of the 
branches of power, political parties and different interest groups. Some of them 
are incorporated into the disguised populist agenda of the legal transformation 
based on conservative political romanticism, a nationalistic xenophobic identity, 
authoritarianism, or involve the direct protection of ethnic clans and oligarchic 
groups in power. Dialogue is important,98 but dialogue between whom? European 
citizens and supranational institutes? different regions of Europe or, rather, national 
98 M. Rosenfeld, Global Constitutionalism: Meaningful or Desirable?, “European Journal of 
International Law” 2014, vol. 25(1), pp. 177–199; S. Bartole, Comparative Constitutional Law – an 
Indispensable Tool for the Creation of Transnational Law, “European Constitutional Law Review” 
2017, vol. 13(4), pp. 601–610.
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governments? branches of power? European and national constitutional courts? 
Could this dialogue be resumed in the rebuilt of trust in the European integration 
project and its judicial instruments on new cultural, political or legal grounds?
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
Conflict Perspective Analysis (CPA) is one mediation method. It reveals the 
positions of the conflicting parties, clarifies differences in positions and gives an 
understanding of the arguments and feelings of the other side. This method reveals 
the parties to the conflict in such a way that they can better see the strong and 
weak arguments (or vulnerability) of another side. Understanding and accepting 
this vulnerability provides an opportunity to move toward conflict resolution. The 
advantage of this method is that it does not initially require the conflicting parties to 
work on a resolution of the conflict itself. The understanding and acceptance of the 
features of one’s own and the other are at the centre of the method. This approach 
makes it useful in complex or protracted conflicts, when the parties may refuse to 
work on resolving the conflict, but nevertheless agree to somehow settle and figure 
out what is happening when they are not satisfied with the conflict situation. The 
immediate solution of the conflict may be a consequence of the use of this meth-
od, but is not its direct goal. CPA is a very useful instrument for the integration/
fragmentation dilemma, using the systematisation, evaluation and criticism of argu-
mentation from both sides in constitution-making in the transnational legal order.99
A practical tool for a better articulation of the polarised positions in the debate 
on global constitutionalism and fragmentation is narrative mediation for structuring 
dialogues about contradicting narratives. This dialogue is possible based on the 
meta-narratives of legal globalisation and fragmentation created by two sides – 
expert-groups from different global regions, countries, international and national 
institutions. These two narratives as represented and reflected in the literature and 
the statements and projects of global constitutional transformation should have 
comparable points and similar questions,100 paving the way from shared truths to 
joint responsibility.101 CPA, based on contested narrative mediation, includes seven 
99 Constitution-Making in Transnational Legal Order, eds. G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, T.C. Holliday, 
Cambridge 2020.
100 R.J. Millard, Adopting Narrative Mediation in Protracted International Conflict: Transcending 
the Relational and Emotional Hurdles to Resolution in Inter-group Conflicts, 2008, http://hdl.handle.
net/1794/8643 [access: 15.08.2021].
101 D. Splinter, L. Wuestehube, From Shared Truths to Joint Responsibility. Training Manual 
for Mediators and Dialog Facilitators, 2017, www.inmedio.de/sites/default/files/training_manu-
al_for_mediators_and_dialogue_facilitators_nepal_withouttrack_changes.pdf [access: 15.08.2021].





stages: presentation; actors; facts; background interests and motivation; options; 
reality check; new discoveries.102
Presentation: at this stage, the parties determine what the opposing positions 
are. In this research, the two meta-narratives are represented by the conflicting 
parties – supporters of global constitutionalism and supporters of global frag-
mentation – as different ways of international legal integration. This division has 
an instrumental character and is used here only to provide a clear articulation of 
difference between them.
The first party’s approach in favour of global constitutional integration can be 
summarised in the following main arguments:
1) the formation of transnational constitutional norms (such as the UN Charter 
or the principles and norms of European law) guarantee individuals a direct 
down-up approach to law and the possibility of avoiding traditional state 
bureaucracy,
2) the origins of multi-layer constitutionalism (international, regional, domes-
tic and local levels) is the basis for a new system of the vertical separation 
of powers more compatible with global democratic priorities beyond state 
borders,
3) the creation of new multi-constitutional or quasi-constitutional frameworks, 
sometimes labeled as “soft law”, challenges the traditional balance of power 
between states and makes the direct dominance of one powerful state more 
difficult,
4) the promotion of more intensive dialogue between transnational and na-
tional parliaments and courts is of crucial importance in order to stimulate 
democracy on different levels of the global governance system (international, 
regional, national and local),
5) in the future, that means the gradual departure from key principles of the 
Westphalian system of international order towards a new system, based on 
transnational norms and institutions.
Fragmentation supporters present another group of arguments:
1) if realised, global constitutionalism means the total unification of global legal 
regulation, dissolving important cultural, regional and historical peculiarities,
2) multi-layer constitutionalism, in reality, means the complication of legal 
regulation inhibiting the adequate fulfillment of rights,
3) transnational constitutional regulation is only possible if there is a global civil 
society. At the current stage, there is no empirical proof of this: constitution-
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states or their regional or global cooperation in international affairs. The 
real problem is the undermining of democratic participation as result of the 
sovereign prerogatives of national states moving to the supra-national level,
4) multi-level institutional dialogue is not a solution. The transfer of national 
prerogatives to unelected supra-national bureaucratic institutions and courts 
demonstrates the erosion of national democracy and the substitution of par-
liamentary rule by the “government by judges”,
5) these developments resumed in the “deficit of democratic legitimacy” as 
result of the pressure of the most powerful international actors on sovereign 
states and minorities.
Challenge: while differentiating the positions, there is a danger of artificially 
sharpening those positions resulting in a “black-and-white” polarity, opposing inte-
gration and fragmentation. In reality, the picture is multifaceted and some positions 
in that debate diverge more, some less.
Actors: at this stage, the parties determine who the main actors are, who cre-
ates and maintain these positions, making them defined and stable for a long time. 
Legal globalisation produced new factors in the division of international affairs and 
the system of new diversified actors with different or even controversial interests – 
sectorial regulatory regimes, international organisations, NGOs and transnational 
corporations, academic think tanks and more or less independent groups of political 
activists acting in parallel with traditional actors – national states and governments.
Their positions are reflected by three groups of intellectuals, one group, who 
strictly support global constitutional integration, another, who support constitutional 
fragmentation as clear alternative to the globalist solution, and the third, who seek 
a compromise between such polarised statements to find any practical solutions 
to the conflict.103
These academic positions represent contrasting visions of the future global 
order and ways towards its creation:
1) the global constitutionalism project, which focuses on the constitution-
alisation of international law as a rational target-oriented policy of legal 
constructivism, supported by the main trans-national actors, global civil 
society, international organisations, corporations and some states,
2) the global fragmentation project, which focuses on sovereignty, regional 
self-organisation and the protection of the cultural and legal identity of 
global regions and civilisations, if not separate states,
103 In Europe, after Brexit, this separation of opinions in society and elites of EU Member States is 
clearly represented by three groups of emotional and intellectual attitudes – Eurooptimism, Europessi-
mism, and Eurorealism. See T. Rainers, M. Goodwin, D. Cutts, The Future of Europe: Comparing 
Public and Elite Attitudes, London 2017. The article of A. Möller and D. Pardijs (The Future Shape of 
Europe, https://ecfr.eu/special/the_future_shape_of_europe [access: 15.08.2021]) include contrasting 
interpretations of EU cooperation forms, fundamental treatises and their future amending strategies.





3) the global functionalist project, maintaining the idea of the spontaneous 
formation of the future global reality as an evolutionary process of new legal 
norms, combining self-regulation and target-oriented initiatives in global 
governance, which can provide a new international legal order.
Challenge: when searching for actors, there is a danger of splitting them up 
into smaller and smaller subsets, some of which are not actually capable of producing 
and maintaining independent narratives. The main subject of debate between three 
mentioned groups divides them into smaller subgroups according to different visions 
of key questions – the balance between international and national law, constitution-
alisation and fragmentation regimes, universal values and regional peculiarities of 
their enforcement, a time-table, the comparative forms of integration (transplantation, 
adaptation or assimilation) of international norms in national jurisdictions.
Facts: at this stage, the parties determine what exactly happened in the past, 
what matters for them today and what both parties agree with. First of all, one 
should focus on proven and reliable sources, from which one can highlight impor-
tant quotes about and significant events in the conflict.
Global constitutionalism, which prevailed at the beginning of the 21st century, 
is now under question regarding new disintegration impulses disguised in different 
forms of “anti-globalism”.
(1) On the current stage, global (and European) constitutionalism appears to be 
under attack by fragmentation trends, opposing regional and national interests to 
the global constitutional agenda. Very often, it was done in the form of right-wing 
and left-wing legal populism.
(2) The populist reaction does not represent any ideology in the strict meaning 
of the word but demonstrates the cognitive dissonance in society – the psychological 
reaction of mass consciousness to the new social reality of a globalised world, the 
irritation and spontaneous neurotic answers to the current social inconsistencies 
and unrealisable beliefs.
(3) The main social resource of the populist reaction to international consti-
tutional values is the progressive erosion of the coherence between national and 
supranational legal regulation. The populist mindset represents its own vision of 
the constitutional transformation, which is based on an important common source 
– the growing degradation of trust in global or European constitutional settlements.
(4) Constitutional populism, in spite of the variety of its representations in dif-
ferent regions of the world (ideological, cultural and legal), includes some common 
traces. Among them, the pessimist view of liberal European values and standards, 
the nationalist interpretation of state sovereignty, a conservative understanding 
of legal traditions and identity as opposed to internationally adopted standards of 
legal regulation. 
(5) The conflict between liberal democracy and illiberal populist trends is 
revealed in the deep mistrust of the independent and neutral character of consti-
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tutional jurisprudence, and an irrational belief in “direct democracy” as a form of 
protection against the “corrupt” elites.
(6) This trend is realised in a wave of constitutional amendments adopted in 
recent decades by countries of CEE, the post-Soviet space, and Russia in order 
to protect national political systems from the external and internal challenges of 
globalism in its liberal interpretation. This turn from liberal cosmopolitanism or 
transnational constitutionalism to a regional and national constitutional identity 
ended the long-term process of constitutional reform and fixed it in a special form 
of “protective” constitutionalism.
(7) “Protective” constitutionalism is a reaction to the global liberal model in 
fragmented legal regions or countries, which are not ready to adopt it fully. Con-
stitutionalism is not fully rejected in all its important principles, but substituted on 
the legislative and cognitive level by restricted norms, institutional frameworks 
and particular judicial interpretations. As a result, instead of a value-oriented form, 
we have a state-oriented form of constitutional interpretation. This could even be 
realised in the form of a constitutional dictatorship, a formally legal transfer of 
power from a nation to its representative – parliament with one-party domination, 
the head of state or national leader – who rules on the grounds of meta-constitutional 
prerogatives given to him by constitutional norms.
It would be a serious mistake to consider all these developments and demands as 
a nonexistent psychological (or cognitive) reality, a simple manifestation of social 
apathy, or the “bad will” of the governments and elites under consideration. The 
populist phenomenon is “real” as an original form of social therapy – the accumu-
lation and legal representation of the disillusionment of the mass consciousness in 
countries which have been confronted with unpredictable challenges to democracy 
after a long period of stable development and exaggerated beliefs.
Challenge: to find facts common to both sides. Media files must be checked 
for authenticity, because there is a large amount of fake information in a conflict 
situation. The reciprocal pretensions of global constitutionalists and legal populists 
should be scrutinised in terms of the substance of their substance and practical 
meaning for policy-makers.
POWER AND TRUTH: INTERESTS, OPINIONS AND REALITY CHECK
Using CPA, three further parameters should be underlined: background interests 
and motivation, opinions, and a reality check.
Background interests and motivations: at this stage, the parties determine 
what underlies the actions of each party described in the facts (stage 3). Here (in 
contrast to the previous stage) interpretations and hypotheses are welcome. Feelings, 
desires, fears that each of the parties experienced in the conflict are expressed. This 





helps to create an “empathy list”. In order to do so, the parties should consciously 
try to “step into the shoes of the other party”.
(1) Transnational constitutional integration is a complex process, including 
the whole corpus of existing international treaties and norms; the readiness of all 
participants to accept and respect them as guiding principles; cooperation between 
new and traditional actors in their promotion.
(2) This process presumes competitive efforts to stabilize or revise the established 
rules of the game; practical cooperation in resolving normative conflicts and political 
disagreements; the variability of adopted strategies of international integration en-
forcement, and the reactions to them in national legal systems. For example, a group 
of states can disagree about the binding force of international norms in one area but 
be in full agreement in the promotion of others. The same is true for an appreciation 
of the disciplining effect of European norms for countries inside the EU and outside 
it. The norms could be adopted as formal legal prescriptions or as recommendations 
and “good practices” of more or less effective global governance regulation.
(3) National political actors can oppose some global projects (for example in 
ecological protection), but be active in supporting the others (for example in the 
prevention of terrorism). The cooperation of international and national actors could 
be more or less important regarding new global challenges such as climate changes, 
internet regulation or the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The readiness for dialogue is 
crucial, especially in upcoming international crises providing unclear consequences 
for global constitutional values and human rights protection.
(4) The crucial problem cannot reduce the integration agenda to a debate on the 
question of how large the world of global constitutionalism is, but questions of how 
large the potential of the world’s legal instability and constitutional twilight is, the 
costs different actors are ready to pay for this, and what should be done on a trans-
national and national level to stop this move toward international legal disorder.
(5) The adoption of that conclusion forms the ground for a dialogue among all 
the important international actors on the global crisis-management strategy imply-
ing a “rational choice” strategy in terms of the norms, institutions and procedures, 
capable of minimising if not stopping the spontaneous degradation of constitutional 
legitimacy and global governance.
Opinions: at this stage, the parties determine where it is possible to build “bridges 
of understanding”. Here it is useful to ask which joint opinions can reduce fears and 
satisfy as many interests and needs as possible. Any suggestions, even the most daring, 
are welcome. Brainstorming can identify collective blind spots and misperceptions 
and is a crucial step in enabling real comprehension between the two parties.
Collective blind spots are issues of the historical narrative of one party, 
which are not seen or recognised by the other party. The categorisation of an issue 
as a collective blind spot does not depend on whether the issue is correctly seen 
from a historical perspective.
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(1) The most prominent criticism of global constitutionalism has been produced 
by the “critical theory” of law and TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International 
Law) representatives.104 They declared the whole system of international law (in 
contrast to national ones) as unfair and a historical expression of the dominance 
of the “Global West” over the “Global East” or over underdeveloped countries 
in different regions of the World, who historically had no voice in the creation of 
the modern global legal order but should have in future. In reality, that means the 
necessity for an alternative, more critical vision of global constitutionalism, its val-
ues, principles and priorities (e.g., in the framework of the so-called “post-liberal” 
concept of the legal order).
(2) The most powerful states are in a position to be even less interested in 
maintaining international law and global cooperation trying to use their historical 
advantage to be sovereign and “exceptional” actors in world affairs, demonstrating 
a commitment to use violence for the protection of their privileged positions.
(3) If this interpretation is true, then the main trend in the nearest future is not 
a cosmopolitan version of global constitutionalism but the growing fragmentation 
of international legal order.
Collective misperception are issues that are recognised by the other side, 
but misperceived. Therefore, in this case, the question of a reliable truth arises. 
Contrary to “normal” issues of a narrative, these issues are not simply seen differ-
ently by each side (every side has its perception of the truth) but due to a lack of 
knowledge or a lack of interest, they are misperceived.
(1) On the one hand, international law continues to develop, demonstrating the 
acute necessity for an integrated system of international regulation, and the existing 
controversies do not devalue its importance because all actors potentially should 
agree about its norms. On the other hand, the system of international norms and 
institutions should be perceived as the product of agreement between states about 
the scope and functions of international norms.
(2) In reality, that means there is growing competition between different regions 
of the world over the new global order – contrasting visions of this order and their 
own place in it.
(3) The search for balance in globalisation should be a priority for all the ac-
tors involved and realised on the basis of constant verification and independent 
international monitoring.
Reality check: at this stage, the parties can criticise the opinions proposed 
at stage (5) in order to bring them closer to reality. The expression of real concerns 
and a rational approach are welcome.
104 B.S. Chimni, op. cit., pp. 3–27; Constitutionalism of the Global South…; A. O’Donoghue, 
R. Houghton, op. cit.





How far could the process of the constitutional restoration go beyond the es-
tablished global or European standards? We traced different aspects of this conser- 
vative transformation in CEE and the post-Soviet region. This includes re-invent-
ed traditionalism and the national legal identity, a reevaluation of representative 
democracy, and of constitutional jurisprudence and the shifting balance of consti-
tutional design and political regimes, the changing balance of formal and informal 
practices regarding their impact on the degradation of the general liberal principles 
of European constitutionalism.
The typology of the constitutional backslide reveals differences in terms 
of the depth, forms, intensity and potential results for the destiny of the demo- 
cratic constitutional integrity of European law. Hence the one crucial criteria of the 
constitutional backslide is not debated – the growing deviation from the principle 
of pluralism in CEE and the post-Soviet space. The typology of countries under 
consideration according to these criteria includes three groups: countries where the 
nucleus of this principle is still alive in spite of some restrictions; countries where 
it has been substantially deformed by new constitutional and legal changes; and 
countries where this principle had become more and more nominal.
Classical liberal democracy has no clear remedies for the populist disease just 
because both of them – democracy and populism – use similar language, terminol-
ogy and electoral mechanisms. The populist transformation could be fulfilled in 
a gradual and even invisible manner, i.e. by legal and institutional transformation. 
That means that we need some complex vision of the causes and effects. Among 
the recommended prescriptions some are of crucial importance: the fulfillment 
of European standards, the abolishment of restrictions imposed by governments 
on NGOs, the development of real political competition and civic organisations, 
a general constitutional enlightenment, pressure on populist governments from the 
supra-national institutional level.
For the replacement of this conservative trend, it is important to re-establish 
the vitality of the eroded liberal identity in its real meaning, to create bridges of 
mutual understanding between supranational and national elites. This could be done 
by promoting trust, a new constitutional agenda and political activism capable of 
overcoming alienation, of filling the vacuum of legitimate legal initiatives in order 
to maintain the integrity of European constitutional settlement, and confronting 
the frustration caused by uneven globalisation and its effects. In order to fulfill 
these targets the systematic elaboration of the new global governance, legal poli-
cies, permanent international legal monitoring, and target-oriented constitutional 
engineering are priorities.
New discoveries: at this stage, the parties sum up. They describe what they 
have learned in the CPA process which was valuable and useful for them, and 
plan how to develop further work in this direction. Of course, the development 
of a common narrative is too far-fetched in the current diversity of global legal 
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growth. Instead, the emphasis should be placed on a better understanding of others’ 
perspectives, how the opposing narratives have developed and what makes them 
convincing for their supporters. The resulting meta-narrative can explain the diver-
gence of contradicting narratives and help to deal constructively with the differences 
in a forward-looking manner.
(1) Constitutionalisation in itself contains fragmentation regarding such issues 
as the creation of a system of new diversified actors with different or even contra-
dictory interests – sectorial regulatory regimes, international organisations, NGOs 
and transnational corporations, academic think tanks and more or less independent 
groups of political activists acting in parallel with traditional actors – national states 
and governments.
(2) In spite of the dichotomy of the two trends in international constitution-
alism, it is not useful to oppose them as mutually incompatible in a framework 
of a simple ideological dilemma – a liberal transnational constitution or illiberal 
fragmented legal regimes.
(3 )The problem should be formulated in another way: How to find the com-
mon areas of interaction, and cooperation in a framework of one and same legal 
globalisation process?
CONCLUSIONS
Global (transnational) constitutionalism is not just a solution, but an experimen-
tal zone seeking the optimal balance between global, transnational, international 
and national law-making institutions, and the results are not predetermined by 
existing legal relations. Global constitutionalism in its current condition is more 
an ideology and ethical attitude than a stable normative construction. The current 
crisis (aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic) has shown the coming of a new 
phase of the decomposition of international law: the growing competition between 
global and national elites over the construction of global governance, demonstrating 
the importance of a consolidated politics of law.
This means that the choice between different models of global governance as 
an important part of globalisation, should be understood as permanent, regulating 
international legal development, in order to protect the common ground for a rea-
sonable compromise between regional legal traditions, principles, actors, levels of 
regulation, institutes and practices. Their interaction, in reality, is not a “zero-sum 
game”. Following this position, the fragmentation of international legal settlement 
– sectoral, regional and functional – has ideological and pragmatic sides.
From an ideological perspective, fragmentation indeed means the growing 
limitation of the role and importance of global constitutionalism. Today it is quite 
reasonable to pose the question: how large is the world of global legal fragmentation 





compared to global legal integration? The very critical position of opponents of 
global constitutionalism (right- or left-wing), however, is not useful. First, they 
have not proposed sustainable solutions for global legal integration, reducing the 
problem to a simplistic opposition, and stimulating regions or states to look for their 
own home-made strategies of self-protection or adaptation (if not assimilation) to 
the global order. Second, in spite of rhetoric repudiating “Europe-centrism”, the 
logic, design and terminology of this approach rest on a predominantly “West-
ern-oriented” basis of constitutional organisation on classic democratic models. 
Third, the final target of global constitutionalism critics is not clear enough to 
their opponents – do they reject it because of its Western origin, or because it is 
constitutionalism (i.e., human rights protection), and henceforth its negation does 
not exclude ipso facto the return to the national autarky and authoritarianism? Such 
questions are highlighted by the current new wave of constitutional retrenchment 
in many countries.
From a pragmatic perspective, fragmentation is a correction of global con-
stitutionalism rather than a strict opposition or alternative to it. Not by chance, 
fragmentation is more visible in those areas of regulation, which are characterised 
by a lack of trust or a vacuum of responsibility, legitimacy and institutional or 
functional regulation. Fragmentation in this understanding is a demand for law 
and justice in areas where the perception of inequality, mistrust, and injustice is 
more obvious than in other more convenient areas of international affairs. In this 
role as a “marker” of problematic issues, fragmentation could even have a positive 
function. It could be regarded as an indicator of problems in the coordination of 
global, regional and national law; an important part of general research to find the 
interaction of normative conflict mediation and institutional practices; a form of 
technical expertise regarding transnational and national dimensions.
If global legal integration and governance are inevitable, the essence of the 
problem is to find a new and more appropriate balance between integration and 
fragmentation in cultural, normative and institutional regulation. The solution to 
these problems would define the possibility of sustainable and solid constitution-
al guarantees for global and national development in the nearest future. In this 
understanding regional legislative machinery provides a laboratory for the elabo-
ration and comparison of projects for international institutional reconfiguration in 
order to avoid global governance dysfunction and the deterioration in “normative 
disorder”; a place for the presentation and deliberation of competing concepts of 
future global and regional stability, legitimacy and reform agendas, necessary for 
approaching this goal. The global rebellion against global constitutionalism in the 
form of fragmentation, therefore, is not a verdict on the fate of global constitution-
alism, but an invitation to renewed dialogue on integration priorities, a dialogue in 
which the eternal struggle between democracy and authoritarianism will continue 
on a transnational level.
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The recommended concepts for this dialogue include rival attitudes to global 
constitutionalism – from positive to negative ones. They can be represented in 
seven competing strategies for the promotion of dialogue:
1) a more traditional concept of using key norms and institutions of international 
law to promote it,
2) a gradual reform of international law where global constitutionalism is seen 
as a product of international law and the associated legal, academic and 
political agenda,
3) the idea of legal dualism in international and national constitutional law 
and their “complementarity”, which means building modes of relations and 
interactions between them,
4) the spontaneous transformation (or adaptation) of law under the new conditions 
of global development through the consistent adoption of new standards and 
sources of law, the rejection of a number of previous fundamental bases (first 
of all, the principle of state sovereignty), or a modification of their meaning,
5) a political interpretation of global law and governance: if understood as 
a process of leveling the conditions for further development, globalisation 
leads to changes in international relations, increasing the role of binding 
obligations, constitutionalism and governance, actualising the consideration 
of law as a “ruler” in general,
6) the principle of the dominance in the process of globalisation of one model 
of democracy (the “Western” one), often linking its fate with one state (the 
US), or a group of states (the “West”),
7) the understanding of global constitutionalism as a constant dialogue between 
its actors, changing the content of a global social contract (the final formula 
of which, in principle, cannot be found). The agreement of the parties to find 
a working balance between integration and fragmentation creates, for the 
participants in the dialogue, a centre of identity which opposes confronta-
tional attitudes to differences and allows the participants to move towards 
a convergence of positions.
From our point of view, a new formula for global constitutionalism can become 
the basis for the consensus in the integration vs. fragmentation dispute. We define it 
from the standpoint of cognitive information theory as a purposeful activity for con-
structing a new global legal order, where the stages are fixed in the projects, norms 
and practices which reflect the progress of the whole society towards this goal.105
The theory of global constitutionalism in this interpretation is a cognitive frame-
work for a value-neutral study of global legal development that goes beyond its 
105 About cognitive theory of legal constructivism, see more in A.N. Medushevskiy, Kognitivnaya 
teoriya prava i juridicheskoe konstruirovanie real’nosti, [in:] idem, Politicheskie sochineniya, Mos-
cow–St. Petersburg 2015.





normative understanding, and include the formation of legal consciousness, a set of 
psychological, institutional and behavioural attitudes of individuals who are aware 
of their belonging to the global community.
Overcoming the conflict of philosophical, normative and functional concepts 
is, therefore, achieved by interpreting them as different (but still complementary) 
logical (linguistic) expressions of values, norms and attitudes of various levels, 
ensuring the unity of the system of global legal regulation.
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ABSTRAKT
Globalizacja dokonała głębokich przekształceń w zakresie prawa międzynarodowego, spraw po-
litycznych i sprawowania władzy, pociągając za sobą wzajemnie sprzeczne konsekwencje. Pobudziła 
kosmopolityczny projekt globalnego konstytucjonalizmu, integracji ponadnarodowej i ujednolicenia 
standardów demokratycznych. Doprowadziła jednak również do fragmentacji sfery spraw między-
narodowych, osłabienia demokracji konstytucyjnej oraz poczucia rosnącego deficytu demokracji na 
szczeblu krajowym i międzynarodowym. Podejmując próbę zrównoważenia wpływu tych dwóch 
przeciwstawnych tendencji, autor analizuje pozytywne i negatywne skutki globalizacji dla rozwoju 
ustroju konstytucyjnego w odniesieniu do takich kwestii, jak: transnarodowa konstytucjonalizacja, 
demokracja i suwerenność narodowa, zmieniające się miejsce wielowarstwowego konstytucjonali-
zmu, międzynarodowy podział władz oraz system globalnego sprawowania rządów przy ustalaniu 
ponadnarodowej legitymacji demokratycznej. Z tego punktu widzenia powrót populizmu w Europie 
Środkowej i Wschodniej wydaje się niebezpieczny i nieprzewidywalny, ale jest to systemowa i po-
tencjalnie przewidywalna reakcja globalnych regionów na nierówności w integracji, brak legitymacji 
demokratycznej, a także nowa odpowiedź na zniekształcenia i dysfunkcje sprawowania władzy na 
świecie. Właściwej odpowiedzi na te wyzwania można upatrywać w nowej koncepcji integracji 
konstytucyjnej opartej na trwającym dialogu między ponadnarodowymi i krajowymi podmiotami 
globalizacji prawnej. Dialog ten jest możliwy dzięki wykorzystaniu strategii mediacji w konfliktach, 
opracowanej przez międzynarodowych ekspertów, zwłaszcza do rozstrzygania skomplikowanych 
i długotrwałych konfliktów, których nie daje się praktycznie rozwiązać w perspektywie krótko- 
i średnioterminowej.
Słowa kluczowe: konstytucjonalizm globalny; konstytucjonalizacja; fragmentacja; suwerenność; 
legitymacja; strategia mediacji w konfliktach
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